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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

In attempting to prepare a paper dealing with American
Negro slavery, this writer is in complete agreement with
Professor Allan Nevins when he expresses his views:
Slavery was a manysided institution. To name no
others, it was a labor system, it was a slow but in
some ways efficient process of education; and it was
a mode of adjustment between two very differently endowed races.
It was also a dynamic institution then
planted in a dynamic social environment. No valid
generalizations regarding slavery can be found upon
emotional impressions, whether bright or grim. Still
less can any generalizations be regarded as sound
which do not carefully discriminate among its various
aspects, and make scrupulous allowance for variegations linked to different times and different places.
Any true picture must present slavery in its protean
character, with all its local diversities, and all
its changes under the impact of new economic forces,
new political pressures, and new humanitarian ideas.
(12:559)
Undoubtedly, slavery was a manysided institution, but
in a limited study of this type, one cannot possibly view all
sides - only one small corner.

Stanley Elkins has said, "The

discipline most likely to impose some kind of objective standards on work dealing with slavery was the discipline of the
law."

(4:3)

Therefore, it is the intention of this work to

take a brief look at Negro slavery as seen in its legal aspects.
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For purposes of clarity and organization this paper
has been divided into chapters covering various phases of
Negro slavery under the law - "Servitude", "Chattels", "Marriage and the Family", "Courts", and "Black Codes in General."

CHAPTER II
SERVITUDE
The first Negroes were imported into the English colonies before the landing of the Pilgrims, and, within a short
time, custom decreed, followed by law, that the status of
these bondsmen be defined.
In the 1660's Maryland and Virginia made the first
important legal distinctions between white and Negro
servants. During this decade various statutes provided that Negroes were to be slaves for life, that
the child was to inherit the condition of the mother,
and that Christian baptism did not change the slaves
and their status. (18:22)
In 1662 Virginia enacted a law clearly defining the
status of the offspring of white men and Negro women.
It is enacted that "whereas some doubts had arisen
whether children got by an Englishman upon a Negro
woman shall be slave or free ••••••• all children born
in this colony shall be bond or free only according
to the condition of the mother." (6:26)
Stanley Elkins concurs that early in colonial days the
period of servitude for the Negro slave became well established.
It became the custom to depress the black ever
closer to a state of perpetual slavery. This tendency was ultimately recognized by the legislatures
of Maryland and Virginia, and they were led to embody in law what had already become fact.
"All the
Negroes or other slaves within the province (according to a Maryland law of 1663) and all Negroes and
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other slaves to be hereafter imported into the province, shall serve durante vita; and all children born
of any Negro or other slave, shall be slaves as their
fathers were for the term of their lives." Such was
the first legal step whereby a black skin would ultimately be equatable with "slave". (4:40)
Elkins further states that firm laws regarding slave
status "had been established during the latter half of the
seventeenth century; a slave was a slave for the duration of
his life, and slavery was a status which be transmitted by
inheritance to his children and his children's children."
(4:52)

Thus, long before the English colonists dreamed of
turning thoughts of freedom and independence into concrete
action in the Revolutionary War, slavery had achieved firm
legal sanction in the colonies.

"On the eve of the War of

Independence American Negro slavery knew no sectional boundaries.

Every colony recognized it and sharply defined the

legal position of free and enslaved blacks." (11:3)
Although the results of the Revolutionary War gave
independence to the United States, and the Bill of Rights
guaranteed many freedoms to the citizens of the new nation,
these did not extend to that position the portion of the
population bound to servitude under the law.

The consti-

tution, in fact, recognized and protected property in persons.

However, mainly due to economic reasons, "by 1830,

whether by legislative, judicial, or constitutional action,
Negro slavery had been virtually abolished in the North."

(11:14)
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As the North became less dependent on slavery, this
condition became even more firmly entrenched in the Southern
states.

Even the color of the skin was evidence of servitude.

Kenneth Stampp asserts:
In all the slave states (except Delaware) the presumption was that people with black skins were slaves
unless they could prove that they were free. Any
strange Negro found in a southern community without
freedom papers was arrested as a fugitive ••••••• offspring of a free white father and a Negro, mulatto,
quadroon or octaroon slave mother was a slave." (18:
194)
In Phillip's American Negro Slavery the findings are
the same:
In general, the letter of the law in slaveholding
states at the middle of the nineteenth century presumed all persons with a palpable strain of Negro
blood to be slave unless they could prove to the contrary, and regarded the possession of them by masters
as presumptive evidence of legal ownership. (14:499)
In Ordeal of the Union, Allan Nevins gives further
credence to the legal servitude of the Negro in the antibellum South:
The legal rule was that the Negro or mulatto child
followed the condition of the mother.
It was also the
rule that every colored person even if the admixture
of African blood was but one-sixteenth or less, was
presumptively considered a slave, and if he asserted
his freedom, the burden of proof fell upon his shoulders.
(12:446)
Not only was it true that a free person of color in the
slaveholding states was suspect as far as condition of servitude was concerned, but as the War Between the States drew
nearer:
Particularly unhappy was the tendency, as the South
grew more militant in defense of slavery, to impose or
forbid the emancipation of bondsmen. Liberation, even
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if it was the act of a white man protecting his child
or rewarding a servant who had saved his life, seemed
treason to the "institution" and was increasingly condemned. Mississippi forbade manumission by her revised code in 1859. Georgia allowed no manumission
save by act of the legislature, or by will arranging
for transportation of the former slaves to some free
areas, and in 1859 the legislature passed a law prohibiting the post-mortem liberation of slaves directly
or indirectly, and within or without the state. Arkansas in 1859 prohibited the emancipation of slaves
either by deed or last will. Alabama did so in 1860.
Other states took similar action. (12:447)
Not until the end of the War Between the States did
complete emancipation come to the slaves as a result of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
This period of legal servitude had lasted over two hundred
years.

CHAPTER

III

CHATTELS
From early colonial days the law firmly established
the term of servitude for a Negro slave for life with his
bond condition being inherited by his descendents.

The law

was just as definite in regard to the status of the slave as
property.

In The Peculiar Institution, Stampp writes:

No specific date marked the legal establishment of
chattel slavery in the South; but there were few obstacles in the way of its development. Neither the
provisions of their charters nor the policy of the
English government limited the power of colonial
legislatures to control Negro labor as they saw fit.
Negroes did not have the benefit of written indentures which defined their rights and limited their
terms of service. (18:22)
J.C. Furnas confirms that legally slaves were chattels
personal long before the Revolution.

Custom first, then for-

mal law, made the slave a personal chattel, like horse or dog,
presumed bond until proved free.

(7:83)

This regard of the

slaves as property did not end when the new nation was formed.
Franklin states that after the colonies secured their independence and established their own governments they did not
neglect the matter of slavery in the laws they enacted.

Where

slavery was growing, as in the lower South in the last eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, new and more stringent
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laws were enacted.

All over the South, however, there emerged

a body of laws generally regarded as the "Black Codes" which
covered every aspect of the life of the slave.

There were

variations from state to state, but the general point of view
was the same in most of such legislation.

The point of view

was that slaves were not persons but property; and laws should
protect the ownership of such property.

(5:186)

J. Saunders Redding expresses his views thusly, "Laws
for the control of slaves grew steadily more rigorous until,
in general, the master's full right of property in his slave
involved absolute control over the slave's person and conduct."
(16:32)
South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia, as well as other
slave-holding states had statutes which recognized slaves as
property.

(14:493)

In the customary phraseology of the ante-

bellum codes, South Carolina's slaves were "deemed, held,
taken, reputed and adjudged in law to be chattels personal,
in the hands of their owners and possessors and their executors
administrators and assignors, to all intents, constructions and
purposes whatever." (18:196)
no exception.

Alabama's legal code of 1852 was

It confirmed the slave's status as property,

giving the owner the right to his time, labor and services and
to his obedient compliance with all lawful commands.

Alabama's

code defined the property status of the slave before acknowledging his human status and throughout the ante-bellum South
the cold language of statutes and judicial decisions made it
evident that, legally, the slave was less a person than a thing.
(18:192)
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It was not just state codes but even the Supreme Court
of the United States in the days before the War Between the
States was willing to confirm the view of the South regarding
the status of slavery.

The South rejoiced at the Dred Scott

Decision, when in 1857, Chief Justice Taney handed down the
famous dictum:
"A Negro has no rights which a white man need respect." In its examination of the meanings of the
words, "people of the United States", in the newly
formed Constitution, the court decided that Negroes
did not come in this category.
"On the contrary,"
according to the court, "they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjagated to the dominant race, and
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to
their authority, and had no right or privileges but
such as those who held the power and the government
might choose to grant them." In this decision, the
planter interest in the South finally succeeded in
having the highest court of the land give legal sanction to a conception of the Negro's status that had
already become a part of the southern mores. (6:43)
The South regarded the legal status of the slave as
property not only as necessary and right, but as beneficial
to the slave.

"Slavery gave the slave the protection which

came of interest in property.

It gave him the rights of a

dependent to well-being and care under adversity." (3:171)
Although there were diverse points of view concerning the
welfare of the slaves as property, there can be no doubt
that, as long as slavery existed, the slave was legally a
chattel - the property of his master - for better or for
worse.

CHAPTER IV
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
One of the basic institutions of this country is that
of the family, but this was not so among the Negro slaves, at
least legally.
sanction.

In general, slave marriages were without legal

(14:500)

Regarding slave marriage, Kenneth Stampp

indicates:
Since slaves, as chattels, could not make contracts,
marriages between them were not legally binding. In
law there was no such thing as fornication or adultery
between slaves; nor was there bastardy, for as a Kentucky judge noted, the father of a slave was unknown
to the law. No state legislature ever seriously entertained the thought of encroaching upon the master's
rights by legalizing slave marriages. (18:198)
Stanley Elkins finds like evidence:
The most ancient and intimate of institutional arrangements, marriage and the family, had long since been
destroyed by the law, and the law never showed any inclination to rehabilitate it.
Marriage, for them, (slaves) was denied any standing
in law. Accordingly, as T. R. Cobb of Georgia admitted
"The contract of marriage not being recognized among the
slaves, none of its consequences follow."
"The relation
between slaves" wrote a North Carolina judge in 1858,
"is essentially different from that of a man and wife
joined in lawful wedlock." (4:53)
Divisions of families presented only a slight legal
problem, if any, when a master desired to sell his slaves.
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Frederic Bancroft states:
Neither marriage nor fatherhood among slaves was
legally recognized because recognition would have
gravely interfered with property rights; and the
legal prohibitions against dividing families were
very slight. Whatever recognition family relations
received was, with few exceptions, voluntary.
Louisiana was least inhuman. It forbade the
sale of children from their mothers less than ten
years of age (and vice versa). In most of the
South, there seems to have been no restriction of
any sort against separating mothers and children
or husbands and wives or selling children of any
age. (2:197)
Allan Nevins also discusses the parting of slave fam
ilies in Louisiana and elsewhere.
mothers were often disregarded.

He contends that even the
Louisiana had a law forbid

ding under severe penalty the parting of mothers and children
under ten, but in practice the parting line was drawn at about
eight years.

Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama had laws which

very slightly hampered the sale, under certain conditions, of
children under six, eight or ten from their mothers, but which
allowed owners of unencumbered slave property to do as they
pleased.

Elsewhere in the South man and wife, child and the

parent, might be parted at will.

All but a small percentage

of the slaves put up by interstate traders were sold singly,
or were mothers with very young children. (12:454)
While the law was quite specific in not recognizing
slave marriages and resulting family relationships:
Many a planter boasted, like Dabney, that he re
quired marriages with proper ceremonies. Edward
Spann Hammond thought marriage should be encouraged
by awards of five dollars for the purchase of house-
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hold articles. But how much validity, could the
family relation possess? Binding ties were not
recognized by law, and ran counter to the economic
interest of owners, for the value of slave property depended in part on its bluidity. (12:449)
It is evident that, in some instances, masters did
allow and even encourage marriage among their slaves, but
there is little doubt that the laws regarding mixed marriages were even more emphatic and more rigorously followed.

Frances Kemble suggests that there is no law in

the white man's nature which prevents him from making a
colored woman the mother of his children, but there is a
law on his statute books forbidding him to make her his own
wife.

(10:15)
If and when marriage and family relationships existed

among the slaves, it was due to the whim and will of the individual master and had no legal standing.

The validity of

slave marriages had little practical purpose in the overall
scheme of the "peculiar institution".

CHAPTER

V

COURTS
For the execution of the distinctive body of "Negro
laws" most colonies, and later the states, had distinctive
courts and procedures.

In most states slaves had no right

to trial by jury and got none.

(16:32)

In criminal prose-

cutions, slaves were considered as responsible persons on
their own score and punishable under the laws applicable to
them.

(4:500)

Criminal statutes established special offenses

which could be committed only by slaves and set up special
tribunals for the summary trial of slaves. (8:51)
In From Slavery to Freedom, John Hope Franklin discusses slavery and the courts:
Ample machinery was set up to provide for the
effective enforcement and execution of the Black
Codes. In some states, slaves were tried in the
regular courts for infractions of the law. In
other states, specially constituted slave tribunals had the responsibility of examining evidence
and judging the guilt or innocence of slaves.
Some states required trials by juries composed of
slaveholders, while others merely required the
cognizance of one, two, or three justices of the
peace. Most of the petty offenses were punishable by whipping; while the more serious were
punishable by branding, imprisonment or death.
Arson, rape of a white woman, and conspiracy to
rebel were capital crimes in all slaveholding
states. There was considerable reluctance to
imprison a slave for a long period or to inflict
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the death penalty on him for the obvious reason
that he represented an investment •••• This is not
to say that slaves enjoyed anything resembling
due process of law or justice in any sense in
which the term applied to free persons. (5:188)
While state codes established regular judicial procedures for the trial of slaves accused of public offenses,
most minor offenses were disposed of without resort to the
courts.

(18:224)

Whipping seems to have been the most com-

mon form of public punishment for less than capital offenses.
(18:209)

However, a great number of crimes not capital when

committed by whites were punishable by death if committed by
a slave, including arson, rape, conspiracy to rebel, striking
a master or any member of the master's family, resisting legal
arrest or punishment, and burglary.

The difficulty was that

an execution destroyed a valuable piece of property for which
the master of the slave must be paid by the government; and in
many cases the real penalty was that the Negro was sold into
some other county or state.

As late as 1808 slaves were

burned alive by order of a court in Charleston; and for supposed complicity in setting a fire in Augusta, in 1830 a slave
woman was executed and quartered.

(8:115)

Records of slave

trials in Baldwin County, Georgia, in the early 1800's indicate most slaves were found guilty, and the sentences were
usually hanging or lashing.

In one case on November 12, 1812,

the State V. Major, a slave, the property of John Neves, was
found guilty on the charge of rape and the sentence was hanging.

At another trial in the same county on November 21, 1816,
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John, a slave, the property of William McGehee, was charged
with stealing a $100 bill.

The verdict was guilty, and he

was sentenced to receive thirty-nine lashes on the bare back
three days in succession.

(15:123)

While slaves might be considered "persons" capable
of committing and being punished for criminal acts, this was
not necessarily true in other court action.

The law denied

colored persons, being property, the right to testify in
cases in which any white person was involved.

(20:704)

From the evidence, it would appear that a historian
of slavery in Kentucky was near the truth when he asserted
that the slave's right of self-defense in the courts amounted
to nothing more than a legal fiction.

(12:445)

But there is

one question which can never be actually answered.

How many

illegal acts were committed by slaves and never reached the
courts?

CHAPTER VI
BLACK CODES IN GENERAL
Incorporated in the "black codes" were statutes stipulating conditions of servitude, marriage and the family, the
chattels and court procedures, which have been covered in the
foregoing chapters.

These codes, however, governed many other

aspects of the slave's life.

These laws rigidly controlled

the slave's movements and his communication with others.

Many

of these laws were designed to lessen the possibility of slave
revolts.

A slave was not to be "at large 11 without a pass.

person was to teach a slave to read and write.

(4:60)

No

Slaves

were not allowed to beat drums, blow horns or possess guns.
Laws prohibited slaves from practicing medicine, possessing
liquor, trading without a permit, gambling, and raising cotton,
swine, horses, mules or cattle. (18:208)

Dogs were taboo.

The

slaves could not own property, sue or be sued, prosecute for a
battery, enter a civil suit, or give evidence against a white
person.

Not even in self-defense could they lift a hand up

against a "Christian" white.

(16:32)

All gatherings of slaves,

even religious meetings, were forbidden unless under the surveillance of whites. (6:91)

No Negro was to be away from his

own plantation without written permission. (8:110)

Every slave
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found more than twenty miles or more from his alleged home
was regarded as a fugitive.

(12:447)

work for others nor earn money.

Slaves were not to do

(2:162)

The police ordinances of the several cities and other
local jurisdictions were in keeping with the state laws which
they supplemented and in some degree duplicated.

At New Or-

leans an ordinance adopted in 1817 and little changed thereafter forbade slaves to live off their masters' premises without written permission, to make any clamorous noise, to show
disrespect to any white persons, to walk with canes on the
streets unless on account of imfirmity, or to congregate except at church, at funerals, and at such dances and other
amusements as were permitted for them on Sundays alone and
in public places. (14:497)
Similarly:
At Richmond an ordinance effective in 1859 had
provisions much like those of New Orleans regarding
residence, clamor, canes, assemblage and demeanor,
and also debarred slaves from the capital square
and other specified public enclosures unless in
attendance on white persons or on proper errands,
forbade them to ride in public hacks without the
written consent of their masters ••.•• (14:498)
The codes did not deal entirely with prohibiting regulations affecting the slaves.

Some statutes were designed for

the protection and well being of the slaves.
lated the hours of labor.

Some codes regu-

South Carolina limited the work

which might be required by Negroes to fourteen and fifteen
hours per day in winter and summer respectively.
218)

(14:492, 18:

All codes forbade field labor on Sunday (18:218).
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Louisiana required meat to be furnished by law and all states
required that food sufficient for the health of the slave be
furnished.

(13:484)

Slaves were to be provided with adequate

clothing and shelter and some codes made cruelty to slaves a
public offense even when not resulting in death.

(18:218)

While the laws were strict and specific, and methods
were set up for carrying out these regulations, enforcement
was a different matter.

What actually happened on a planta-

tion was often unknown.
Most historians agree with Ulrich Phillips:
It may fairly be said that these laws for the
securing of slave property and the police of the
colored population were as thorough and stringent
as their framers could make them, and they left
an almost irriducible minimum of rights and privileges to those whose function and place were
declared to be service and subordination. But in
fairness it must also be said that in adopting
this legislation the Southern community largely
belied itself, for whereas the laws were systematically drastic the citizens in whose interest
they were made and in whose hands their enforcement lay were in practice quite otherwise. It
would have required a European bureaucracy to keep
such laws fully effective. The individualistic
South was incapable of the task. If the regulations were seldom relaxed in the letter, they were
as rarely enforced in the spirit. The citizens
were too fond of their own liberties to serve
willingly as martinets in the routine administration of their own laws; and in consequence the
marchings of the patrol squads were almost as
futile and farcial as the musters of the militia.
The magistrates and constables tended toward a
similar slackness. (14:501)
These slave patrols were made up of free white men who
did rotating service in the patrol.

These patrols were to

apprehend fugitive Negroes, visit slave quarters and search
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for weapons, and to visit assemblies of Negroes where disorder might develop.

Actually, many citizens found this ser-

vice inconvenient and regularly paid the imposed fines for
dereliction of duty.

(5:188, 7:134, 8:110)

Also, it must be

remembered that nearly every master preferred to take all
matters involving his slaves into his own hands and to mete
out justice in his own way.

(5:189)

Ordinarily the slave codes were much mitigated in
practice.

(1:75)

Frederic Bancroft reports:

There was an increasing practice of virtually
hiring certain kinds of slaves to themselves, especially supposedly trustworthy and resourceful
carpenters, blacksmiths, etc. by allowing them to
earn and retain money according to their opportunities, on condition that they give their masters
stipulated sums or percentages of earnings each
week or month. This, being in direct conflict
with the spirit of slavery, was forbidden in all
the slave states; but it was freely practiced,
and prosecutions for violations of the laws were
so rare as to be almost curiosities. (2:162)
Ulrich B. Phillips, author of The Old South, states
that the custom of hiring out Negro artisans was common in
many parts of the South.

When a master craftsman died, his

widow often found that she could depend on a fair revenue
from the work of his slave helpers.

Others seem to have

made a business of purchasing trained artisans in order to
hire them out to contractors or craftsmen.

(19:231)

Some

masters winked at regulations in codes and permitted slaves
to gather in illegal assemblies, trade without permits, hunt
with guns, and even encouraged slaves to read and write.
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Some slave owners even allowed marriage.

(18:228)

In town,

a slave's chances to learn to read, write or cipher greatly
increased.

(7:165)

In many jurisdictions to do business with

a slave without his master's consent was illegal.

Such laws

were no better enforced than any others in the "black codes".
More realistically, slaves around Natchez were allowed to
flock to town on Sunday to go to church, trade and gossip until a four o'clock bell warned them to be out of town in ten
minutes.

( 7: 108)

Most certainly the "black codes" strictly controlled
nearly every aspect of the life of the slave - in theory.
practice, the slave was governed more by arbitrary men.

In
Iso-

lation of plantations, distances to be policed, laxity of the
patrols and other law enforcement agencies, and the attitude
of masters and overseers toward disciplining their own slaves,
all were factors which contributed in making the control of
slaves according to law a somewhat less-than-efficient system.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY
It is difficult, if not impossible, to deal with American Negro slavery in an entirely objective manner.

As Kenneth

Stampp suggests, "The exact truth will never be known, because
surviving records are fragmentary and sometimes hint only very
vaguely at condition.

There is no way to discover what went

on in the 'voiceless solitudes' where no records were kept."
(18:181)

However, existing records indicate that legally the
slave was severely controlled, and that no aspect of slave
life escaped the numerous statutes compiled for this purpose.
Certainly, if our view of slavery rests on the wording of the
law alone, we can agree that slavery was cruel and unjust.
But the "other side of the coin" reveals that policy and practice were often not the same.

Laws often lacked enforcement,

and the master was much more responsible for the actions of
his slaves than were the courts and other law-enforcement agencies.

The "code" of the South required that a gentlemen treat

his slaves kindly and fairly; and a "true gentlemen" would not
presume to do otherwise.
My viewpoint regarding the legal aspects of slavery and
the institution in general parallels that of Ulrich Phillips
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in which he says:
The government of slaves was for the ninety and
nine by men, and only for the hundredth by laws.
There was injustice, oppression, brutality and
heartburning in the regime ••••••• There was also
gentleness, kind-hearted friendship and mutual
loyalty. (14:514)
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